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ON THE VOLUNTARY
ADMISSION OF MINORS
The past several years have been witness to dramatic changes
in both the theory and practice of civil commitment.1 In the law,
this development has taken the form of increased concern for the
protection of the personal liberties of the mentally ilL2 while
among members of the medical profession it has been experienced
as a part of the process of opening up the back wards. Legisla-
tures in many states have responded by revising their mental
health statutes to establish more rigorous standards for com-
mitment, periodic review of the status of committed patients, and
better procedural safeguards throughout the commitment pro-
cess.3 Courts have found portions of commitment statutes uncon-
stitutional in several states. 4
While this concern over the rights of individuals confronted
with the prospect of involuntary civil commitment promises to
1 Civil commitment is defined herein to include any compulsory hospitalization or other
confinement on an inpatient basis that is for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of
mental illness.
2 See, e.g., R. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS (1973); A.
KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971). For one of the most current, and certainly
among the most comprehensive reviews of the state of the law of civil commitment as it
relates to adults, see Development in the law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill. 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
3 See, e.g., NEW YORK MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (McKinney Supp. 1973); CAL. WEL-
FARE AND INSTITUTIONAL CODE §§ 5000 et seq., esp. § 5325 (West Supp. 1973); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-178 and 17-206 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394 (1973); LA.
REV. STAT. § 28:52 (West Supp. 1973).
4 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wisc. 1972), remanded for more specific
order, -U.S____94 S.Ct. 713 (1974), decision on remand No. 71 C 602 (E.D. Wisc.
Aug. 15, 1974) (Wisconsin); Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, _ F. Supp ,
consolidation of E.D. Mich. and W.D. Mich. No. 36384 (3 judge court, June 1, 1974)
(Michigan); Garwood v. Maguire, No. 74-290 (E.D. Pa., March 21, 1974) (Pennsylvania);
Schneider v. Radach, (S.D. Cir. Ct., Yankton County, May 9, 1974) (South Dakota). In
addition, cases challenging the constitutionality of commitment laws have been filed in
Ohio and Kentucky. See Ewing v. Gaver, No. C. 74-147 (N.D. Ohio, filed April 10,
1974); Kendall v. True, No. 74-64 L (a) (W.D. Ky., filed March 1974). Lessard v. Schmidt
supra, is perhaps the most far reaching'of these cases to date. In 1972, a three-judge court
held the Wisconsin civil commitment statute invalid on its face and enjoined its operation.
The Supreme Court remanded, finding that the lower court had failed to comply with the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) that an injunction must be specific. On remand, the
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produce wide-ranging reform in mental health legislation, 5 little
specific concern has been shown for the rights of minors in these
circumstances. To be sure, the unique situation of minors is not
entirely obvious; this is because the term "voluntarily" is a mis-
nomer as applied in this context. An adult who enters an in-
stitution either does so of his own volition-that is, as a voluntary
admission, or is compelled to do so by some form of state in-
tervention- that is, by some commitment process. 6 If he chooses
to withhold his consent, he may not be admitted as a voluntary
patient, but he must be committed. In such a case his illness must
theoretically be shown to be of sufficient severity to satisfy an
objective standard 7 at a hearing before a disinterested tribunal at
which he is given the opportunity to represent his interests. 8 Since
three-judge court held that the action is a class action on behalf of all persons eighteen
years of age or older who have been held or will be held involuntarily pursuant to any
provision of the Wisconsin involuntary commitment statute. The court held the statute
unconstitutional on due process grounds because it fails to provide for notice to the patient
of the factual basis for detention, the right to jury trial, clear standards for detention, a list
provided to the patients of those who will testify in favor of commitment and a summary of
their proposed testimony, notice to the patient of his right against self-incrimination, a
probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours of detention, appointment of counsel, the
right to be present at the hearing, the right to a full hearing within fourteen days of
detention, and due process safeguards at hearings whenever held. In addition, the court
found the statute defective in that it does not require a finding beyond reasonable doubt
that the patient is mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others and does not require that
all less drastic alternatives to hospitalization be explored. The court ordered that proce-
dures in accordance with its opinion be followed and that in future commitment hearings
attorneys for committed individuals be given reasonable access to their clients and to
hospital records pertaining to them. But contra Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973), in
which the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a Connecticut statute similar to Wisconsin's.
Thus, the stage may be set for Supreme Court action on this controversy.
5 Michigan has recently rewritten its mental health code. See notes 8 1-100 and accom-
panying text infra. Illinois is now considering a revision of its mental health code as well.
6 Such commitment processes include emergency commitment, diagnostic orders, and
judicial commitment. A three-judge court has recently held that commitment by means of
the ninety day diagnostic order as utilized in Michigan is unconstitutional. Bell v. Wayne
County General Hospital, -F.Supp. , consolidation of E.D. & W.D. Mich. No.
36384 (June 1, 1974).
7 Standards vary widely from state to state and according to whether the commitment is
"emergency" or "non-emergency." For emergency commitment the increasingly preferred
standard is that the individual be dangerous to himself or others, and that this be mani-
fested by imminent threat of such danger. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (1963) CHAP.
51 §§ 1-3 ("apt to injure himself or others"); LA. REV. STAT. § 28:52 (West Supp.
1973) ("dangerous to himself or others and/or makes him incapable of caring for himself or
his personal safety"); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-28 (Supp. 1973) ("mentally ill
and because of his mental illness is likely to cause injury to himself or others if not
immediately restricted"). But contra NEW JERSEY STAT. ANN. § 30:463 ("that the condi-
tion of the patient is such as to require care and treatment in a mental hospital.") Statutes
as tautologous as that of New Jersey are, fortunately, giving way to more specific criteria.
8 There are, of course, wide-spread abuses of the commitment process as it applies to
adults. These include such practices as pro-forma commitment hearings in which the
prospective patient is unrepresented by counsel (some as brief as two minutes), deliber-
ately vague and vacuous standards, and the use and "piggy-backing" of diagnostic orders.
See, e.g., Comment, Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Ari-
zona, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (1971). In the Detroit area, a story is told of the judge who,
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few state mental health statutes explicitly differentiate between
adults and minors, 9 it is reasonable to infer that minors would be
similarly treated. However, this is not so. While an adult has the
option of withholding consent to admission to a mental hospital, a
minor does not. Voluntary admission, as it applies to minors, is a
process in which the decision regarding admission is entirely in
the hands of the parents or guardian and the institution to which
admission is sought. 10 No objective standard need be applied,
apart from the hospital's own admission criteria, and there is no
judicial appeal." Consent is given or withheld by the child's
parents and he can be "voluntarily" admitted despite his most
strenuous objections.
Because of its informality and ease of implementation, hospital
administrators prefer the voluntary admission procedures for mi-
nors. 12 While accurate statistical data on the percentage of minors
"voluntarily" admitted to mental hospitals as compared to the
total number of minors in such institutions is difficult to obtain, it
seems fair to say that most of the minors currently in mental
hospitals were initially admitted on a voluntary basis.' 3 In sharp
contrast, a survey of state mental hospitals in Oakland County,
awakened in the middle of the night, signed a commitment order in his living room and
returned to bed.
But the thrust of reform has been in this area, and in many states these efforts have met
with considerable success. See notes 5-7 supra.
9 California and Michigan are exceptions.
10 See, e.g., the former, and still quite typical, Michigan statute as it pertains to this
matter, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.18, and note 54 infra.
11 Id.
12 It has been said
Voluntary admission to a mental hospital, many psychiatrists tell us, brings
some special benefits to the patient. Treatment at an earlier stage; mainte-
nance of better morale, which induces a more cooperative attitude on the
patient's part; and preservation of the patient's dignity and sense of
self-direction are all assumed to help with his recovery. Psychiatrists and
other physicians in New York State who answered a questionaire from our
committee generally agreed that the form of admission involving the least
compulsion is best.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMMITMENT PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS 56-57 (1962).
13 As an example, there are roughly 750 beds for minors in the Michigan State mental
health system. In early 1974, Hawthorn Children's Center had an in-patient population of
152, of which only 15 were committed involuntarily. (Dr. Wright.) At York Woods Center,
in Ypsilanti, Michigan, "about 40%" voluntary. (Rosalyn Rodgers, R. N..) Children's
Psychiatric Hospital accepts only voluntary admissions. (Dr. Peter BIos.) See note 101
infra. Although accurate information on the percentage of voluntarily admitted minors in
the remaining state-connected hospitals was not obtainable, it appears, on the basis of
information available that certainly the sizeable majority of minors in Michigan state
institutions had been placed there by informal, voluntary admissions. There is no reason to
believe that Michign is atypical in this respect.
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Michigan, in 1967 and 196914 revealed that only 16.4 percent of
the total patient population had initially entered voluntarily. 15 The
contrast is even more striking when one notes that fully 13.4
percent of the total patient population were minors, most of whom
must be assumed to have entered "voluntarily.' 16 One is led to
conclude that the process whereby most minors are placed in
mental hospitals is one which gives them neither the right to
withhold consent, nor any other legal safeguard,1 7 and one which
consequently offers no external protection against the possibility
of abuse. Such a process, if applied to adults, would be a flagrant
denial of the most rudimentary principles of due process. This
article will examine the reasons underlying this distinction be-
tween the status of adults and minors, to evaluate the procedures
and criteria currently employed in the "voluntary" admission of
minors to mental hospitals, and suggest one or two possible ways
to better protect the interests of minors.' 8
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMISSION STANDARDS
At common law, minors were regarded as the property of their
parents. In England, a father had the right to sell his son into
indentured servitude, and exercised virtually unrestrained domi-
nion over the affairs of his female children. It is said, perhaps
apochryphally, that the first case of child abuse prosecution in the
United States did not occur until 1874, when a church social
worker learned of a child who was kept in chains, frequently
14 Note, Civil Commitment in a Suburban County: an Investigation by Law Students,
13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 518 (1973).
15 Id. at 526.
16 Id. at 524. See also note 13 supra.
17
The large majority of adolescents are brought for treatment by their families,
and while the adolescent does not usually object to the extent of
non-cooperation, he often fails to participate actively in treatment. ...
Characteristically, once their initial protest has been made, they will accept
the hospital .... Other adolescents are either seriously disturbed themselves
or come from families that have no understanding of the realities of the
situation, or both. With these more difficult cases the significant family
members just cannot voluntarily bring themselves to allow the hospital to
take responsibility for even temporary management of the patient. Since the
firm backing of the parent or legal guardian is necessary if an adolescent is to
be kept in a hospital, other than a legally committed basis, a useful device is
for the patient to be made a ward of the county juvenile court or equivalent
agency. This is not as difficult as it sounds, since often in practice this type of
family has such poor control over the adolescent that antisocial acting out
has already been brought to the attention of the court.
E. HARTMANN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 37-38 (1968).




beaten, and fed only bread and water. After unsuccessfully at-
tempting to interest various state and municipal agencies in the
child's plight, she finally prevailed upon the American Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to bring suit against the little
girl's parents. The Society won, the court holding that children,
being part of the animal kingdom, were entitled to the same
protection as was afforded other animals. It was the public furor
that followed this decision that produced the first child abuse
statute in the United States.19
As late as 1904, in a dispute between a mother and her daugh-
ter over the daughter's placement in a reform school, a court
could hold that
The child ... having no right to control her own action or to
select her own course of life, had no legal right to be heard in
these proceedings.
20
In the early part of this century, there began a slow erosion of the
absolute power enjoyed by parents over their minor children. The
notion that the state had an independent interest in protecting the
child against abuses found its expression not in a broadening of
the child's rights, but in a narrowing of those of the parent. 21 In
Michigan, the earliest cases had, not to do with minors, but with
the protection of another unemancipated class -married women.
In re Phillips22 was an attempt by Mrs. Phillips' adult son to have
her declared incompetent and to have himself appointed guardian
of her not inconsiderable estate. He based his application on the
fact that she had previously been committed to a "hospital for the
insane" for a period of six months by a petition of her husband.
The court denied the application on the grounds that the original
commitment order had been in violation of the law, 23 and thus
there was no evidence of insanity. The court said,
Proceedings taken for an adjudication of insanity against an
individual should require the strictest compliance with all the
statutory requirements provided. The determination affects
the rights of the individual to life, liberty, and property.
Courts will ever protect the rights of the individual who is so
unfortunate as to be called upon to make a showing to main-
19 A. DE FRANCIS, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CHILD PROTECTION 3-5 (1955).
20 Rule v. Geddes 23 App. D.C. 31, 50 (1904).
2 1See notes 31-37 and accompanying text infra.
22158 Mich. 88, 122 N.W. 554 (1909).
23 The hearing was held 24 hours before the time fixed in the order and Mrs. Philips was
r.ot present. She was declared insane and committed within 24 hours after the husband's
petition was filed. Id. at 159, 122 N.W. at 556.
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tain his or her mental integrity. It is apparent that the original
proceedings ... did not comply with the statute .... To hold
this to be an orderly judicial proceeding would be a travesty
upon the administration of justice.
24
Citing Phillips, In re Davis25 held that in the absence of a
showing of an independent inquest as required by law,26 affidavits
by two physicians to the effect that Myrtle Davis was mentally
diseased were insufficient to satisfy the statute and that the com-
mitment proceedings were, therefore, a nullity. The principle set
forth in Davis was that the statute pertaining to the commitment
of "insane persons"' 27 required scrupulous compliance including
independent inquest, the taking of proofs, and a full investigation
of the facts. In effect, Davis invalidated commitment orders aris-
ing out of proceedings in which little or no testimony apart from
written affidavits was presented to establish insanity.
2 9
Because the practice of voluntary admission was not permitted
at that time,3 0 all commitment proceedings involved judicial hear-
ings; the Davis principle was thus available for application to
proceedings against minors as well as those against adults. In In
re Miller,3 1 apparently the first case in which the principle was
applied to a minor, there is no mention of the petitioner's youth.
Rather, it is simply observed that because petitioner's com-
mitment to a training school had been based solely on the certifi-
cates of the doctors who had examined him and because no other
24 Id.
2 277 Mich. 88,268 N.W. 822 (1936).
26 Cited by the court as "2 Comp. Laws 1929 § 6888." The court quotes the statute as
follows:
the court shall also institute an inquest and take proofs, as to the alleged
insanity, feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, or mental disease of such person, and
fully investigate the facts before making such order. Id. at 91, 268 N.W. at
823.
27 277 Mich. 88, 89, 269 N.W. 822, 823 (1936).
2 8See, e.g., In re Clifford, 303 Mich. 84, 5 N.W.2d 575 (1942); In re Ryan, 291 Mich.
673, 298 N.W. 291 (1939).
29 See, e.g., In re Gordon, 301 Mich. 224, 3 N.W.2d 353 (1942).
30 The rule was:
An admission of insanity can never fix the status of unsound mind in the
person making the admission. The law prescribes the only way a determina-
tion of insanity may be made.
In re Philips, 158 Mich. 155, 160, 122 N.W. 554, 556 (1904); In re Ryan, 291 Mich. 673,
676, 298 N.W. 291, 292 (1939).
31 303 Mich. 81, 5 N.W.2d 575 (1942). See also In re Maffet, 304 Mich. 173, 7 N.W.2d
260 (1943), in which the court found the commitment of a 14 year old boy invalid on
precisely the same grounds as are cited in Miller. In the latter case the court notes that




proof was offered, compliance with the statute3 2 was lacking; the
commitment order was accordingly invalid.
The right of the subject of the proceedings to be present at the
commitment hearing was extended to minors in In re Roberts,33 a
case which held that without a showing that it would have been
impossible for the minor to be present at the hearing, his absence
alone was sufficient to render the commitment order a nullity. But
it was not until In re Aslanian3 4 that judicial protection against
improper commitment procedures began to be extended to mi-
nors. In that case, the girl's mother brought a writ of habeas
corpus to secure her daughter's release from a training school to
which she had been committed as "feeble-minded" six years
earlier. The original commitment petition had been made by her
father, who at the time had sole custody of her. At the initial
hearing two physician's certificates had been presented, as well as
the testimony of a social worker that the girl was "a very serious
sex delinquent."35 It was found that
... the court did not conduct a proper inquest, take sufficient
proofs, or make a full investigation of the facts, without which
the order of commitment is a nullity.36
Though the court acknowledged that
at the time she was commited, the girl was not only feeble-
minded and a sex delinquent, as charged in the petition, but
that she was a behavior problem as disclosed by the record,
3 7
it ordered her release. Aslanian thus supports the proposition that
the dangers of abuse of commitment proceedings are so great that,
even in a case in which proper procedures would have resulted in
a legally justifiable commitment, resort to improper procedures
would require that the commitment order be voided.
The development of the voluntary admission procedure came
substantially afterAslanian, and there is no question that it is a
legitimate practice under current statutes. Yet it is informative to
compare the grounds upon which the court ordered the girl in
Aslanian released with the fact situation of a voluntary com-
mitment. InAslanian there was a hearing at which affidavits and
32 Cited by the court as "2 Comp. Laws 1929 § 6888 as amended by Act No. 104, Pub.
Acts 1937 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1940, § 6888, Stat. Ann. 1940 Cum. Supp. § 14.811). In re
Miller 303 Mich. 81, 82, 5 N.W.2d 575,576 (1942).
33 3 10 Mich. 560, 17 N.W.2d 752 (1945).
34 318 Mich. 55, 27 N.W.2d 343 (1947).
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some testimony were presented; in a voluntary admission there is
no hearing. InAslanian the girl's father petitioned for her admis-
sion to a training school; in a voluntary admission the parent
consents to the child's admission to a mental hospital. In a volun-
tary admission the child has no right to be present when the
decision on admission is made; in A slanian the girl's absence from
her commitment hearing was specifically cited as an omission
sufficient to compel her release. If anything, greater protection
was given to the girl in hearings which were found defective for
insufficiency than is afforded the minor child in the voluntary
admission process as it currently functions.
It must be recognized, however, that in none of these instances
did a minor bring the action on his or her behalf and that in none
of them was the decision based upon a recognition of the minor
child as an individual with legitimate rights and interests apart
from those of his parents or of the state. Judicial intervention was
at the behest of a petitioner who was viewed as having the right to
speak for the minor. The minor was not permitted to act on his
own initiative. It was not until In re Gault"8 that such rights and
interests were recognized. Gault had to do with a juvenile delin-
quency conviction based on an obscene telephone call. The Su-
preme Court, in an opinion by Justice Fortas, held that the boy
therein committed had been denied due process because
juvenile delinquency proceedings which may lead to com-
mitment in a state institution must measure up to the essen-
tials of due process-and fair treatment, including
1) written notice of the specific charge or factual allegations,
given to the child and his parents sufficiently in advance of
the hearing to permit preparation;
2) notification to the child and his parents of the child's right
to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are
unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to
represent the child;
3) application of the consitutional privilege against self-
incrimination; and
4) absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency
and an order of commitment based only on sworn testimony
subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accor-
dance with consitutional requirements. 39
38 387 U.S. i (1967). Gault has been the subject of such exhaustive examination by
scholars and practitioners alike that one commentator has been moved to suggest that "If
the authors of law review articles about Gault were laid end to end, it would be a good
thing." Kenon, On Re-examing Gault-Again andAgain, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 387 (1970).
39 387 U.S. at 2 (1967).
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Following Gault, the question was no longer whether minors
had any personal rights, but what the limits of their rights were. A
constitutional collage has emerged, with minors achieving the
rights of adults in some cases but not in others. In re Winship40
established that, notwithstanding the "rehabilitative nature" of
juvenile delinquency proceedings, a juvenile charged with having
committed what would be, for an adult, a criminal offense, is
entitled to the same presumption of innocence that an adult en-
joys; that is, his or her guilt must be established "beyond a
reasonable doubt."'41 However in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,4 2
the Court, while recognizing that certain due process procedural
safeguards apply to delinquency proceedings, held that the right to
a jury trial is not among them. Although state juvenile delin-
quency codes are notoriously vague, persistent attempts to have
them declared "void for vagueness" have been uniformly unsuc-
cessful. 43 Finally, despite a cautious trend extending the limited
due process rights enjoyed by adult prisoners to those confined in
juvenile correctional institutions, the discretion of juvenile correc-
tional administrators remains largely unfettered. 44
40 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
41 Id. at 365-68.
42 403 U.S. 528 (197 1). Accord, In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
4 A typical case is In re L.N., 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150 (1970). A youth
apprehended for allegedly sniffing "carbona" (a carbon tetrachloride base cleaning fluid)
was prosecuted for delinquency under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 4-14, subsections (i)
("Growing up in idleness or delinquency") and (m) ("deportment endangering the morals,
health, or general welfare of said child"). In rejecting the defense assertion that the statute
was "void for vagueness," the court said:
He has cited no case, and we know of none, in which statutes of this type
containing wording similar to that found in subsections (i) and (m) have been
held to be unconstitutional as violating due process by reason of vagueness.
Statutes setting up juvenile systems of correction have been uniformly upheld.
(Petition of Morin, 95 N.H. 518, 68 A.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Cinque v.
Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1923); State v. Mattiello, 4
Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (App. Div. 1966), cert. denied 225 A.2d 201
(1966), cert. granted 391 U.S. 963, 88 S. Ct. 2037, 20 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1968),
appeal dismissed 395 U.S. 209, 89 S. Ct. 1767, 23 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1969);
Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E. 892, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1913); Com. v.
Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62A. 198 (Sup. Ct. 1905). . . .many carried wording
closely akin or substantially similar to that of our own statute. Their con-
struction and applicability appear to have posed no difficulty ....
We are satisfied that the Supreme Court did not intend In re Gault to
undermine the basic philosophy, idealism, and purposes of the juvenile
courts .... The juvenile court proceeding is not the trial of a child charged
with a crime but is mercifully designed to save him from such an ordeal in the
future. ... It has been said to be designed to make men out of errant boys ....
The state as parens patriae has a duty to see that a minor does not live the
life of delinquency.
Id. at 284-85, 263 A.2d at 153-54.
44 For a discussion of this topic, see Meyers, Legal Rights in a Juvenile Correctional
Institution, 7 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 242 (1973).
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As a general rule, parental authority is controlling in matters
pertaining to the child's welfare.
Parental power probably cannot be defined except as a resi-
due of all power not lodged elsewhere by the law .... Much
authority . . . supports the general proposition that except
where there is some authoritatively expressed public policy to
the contrary, parental power extends to all areas of a child's
life. 4
5
However, courts have been increasingly willing to consider the
child the best judge of his or her interest, even when the child's
view conflicts with that of the parent. In re Smith,46 while
affirming both a finding that a sixteen-year-old girl who had run
away from home in order to avoid having an abortion was a "child
in need of supervision" and an order placing her in her mother's
custody, also held that the mother did not have the right to
compel her daughter to have an abortion. The court said,
[T]he minor, having the same capacity to consent as an
adult, is emancipated from the control of the parents with
respect to medical treatment within the contemplation of the
statute. We think it follows that if a minor may consent to
medical treatment as an adurt ... the minor, and particularly
a minor over 16 years of age, may not be forced, more than
an adult, to accept treatment . . . . Consent cannot be the
subject of compulsion; its existance depends upon the ex-
ercise of voluntary will of those from whom it is obtained; the
one consenting has the right to forbid.
47
Similarly, it has been held that although parents have the right to
attempt to commit their child, they cannot compel the child to
accept their attorney in commitment proceedings, nor have they
the right to waive the child's doctor-patient privilege. 48
Although no instance has been found in which a minor was held
to have the right to refuse his or her "voluntary" admission to a
mental institution, in Application for the Certification of
Anonymous, 49 the parents were not permitted to place their
ten-year-old child in a mental hospital when such hospitalization
was not shown to be necessary. Responding to the allegation that
the child was in the habit of setting fires, the court, after noting
45 Kleinfield, The Balance of Power among Infants, their Parents, and the State, 4
FAMILY L.Q. 410, 413 (1970).
46 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972).
47 Id. at 246.
41 In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953).
4942 Misc. 2d 572, 278 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1964).
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several inconsistencies in the allegation, demonstrated unusual
sensitivity to the factors underlying the juvenile's behavior. It
said,
[T]here is nothing abnormal about the behavior of this child
that cannot be dissolved by the human catalyst of love and
affection. One aspect of this proceeding that ... shocks and
perturbs this court is the attitude of the adoptive parents of
this child. Their personal attitude and the atmosphere they
supplied on behalf of this child was ... completely devoid of
any affection or feelings that were conducive to the in-
culcation of a feeling of belonging and of being loved ....
The attitude of the adoptive parents caused the child to hal-
lucinate in regressive stages, which compels the court to
volunteer the opinion that the adoption be abrogated with
dispatch. 50
The court went on to observe that it was this lack of care that was
probably the causal factor behind the child's delinquent behavior.
Among the few cases in which the "voluntary" admission of a
minor has been directly challenged 5' is In re Slayton,52 which
involved a fifteen-year-old youth who had been confined, despite
his objections, as a "voluntary" admission on his father's appli-
cation. A writ of habeas corpus was brought which alleged, first,
that he had been denied due process in that he was being held in
the institution without a hearing, that he had not consented to his
admission to the institution, and that the statutory language 53 did
not permit the inference that he had done so; and second, that in
so far as the Michigan Mental Health law provided for in-
carceration of minors without a hearing, it was unconstitutional on
50 Id. at 609.
51 See notes 95-100 and accompanying text infra.
52 No. 183756 (Mich. Wayne County P. Ct. 1972).
The statute construed in Slayton read as follows: the medical superintendant
of any institution named in this act may receive and detain any adult or minor
who is desirous of submitting himself to treatment in such institution as a
voluntary patient, and who makes written application therefor and whose
mental condition is such as to render him competent. If such a person is
under 21 years of age and not an emancipated child, the written application
shall be made by the parent or the guardian of such child. .. . Any voluntary
patient shall not be detained for more than five days after giving notice in
writing of his inclination or desire to leave such institution, but if such person
is under 21 years of age and not an emancipated child, the written notice
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its face. 54 The court, avoiding the constitutional issues, read the
statute narrowly. Since the statute, literally interpreted, required
that a minor desire to be admitted to an institution and since there
was no showing that John Slayton had expressed such a desire,
his admission was void. The case attracted considerable attention,
and the decision occasioned the rapid passage of an amendment to
the mental health statute. 55 In its amended form, the statute is still
open to the constitutional challenge which Slayton presented, for
it explicitly provides for the detention of minors in mental hospit-
als on the application of their parents, without any inclusion of the
due process requirements ordinarily applicable to adults; as Jus-
tice Fortas wrote for the Court in Gault, "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.
' '56
Melville v. Sabbatino57 presented a similar fact situation. A
seventeen-year-old youth who had been "voluntarily" admitted to
a private psychiatric institute at the age of fifteen succeeded in
54 The writ advanced three causes of action:
Minor John Slayton is being deprived of his liberty and held in a state facility
for mentally ill or emotionally disturbed persons with due process of law. He
has had no hearing in any court of law or before any proper administrative
board warranting his detention in a state institution for the mentally ill or
emotionally disturbed. Minor John Slayton has no desire to be confined in the
Hawthornes' Children's Center. The statute ... under which a minor can be
confined would seem to require some showing that the minor is desirous of
such commitment. (No document exists showing John Slayton's consent to
his detention and confinement and to the extent that the statute can be read
to assume the minor's consent to his commitment, it is unconsitutional as
applied to a situation such as that presented to this court, in so far as it denies
to minor the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to all citizens under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.)
M.S.A. Sec. 14.80999) is unconstitutional on its face, since it results in the
deprivation of liberty of all minors in the state of Michigan who are com-
mitted without hearings upon the consent of their parents. Minors therefore
may be substantially deprived of their liberty without hearing and without a
proper waiver at a time when they may be said to be sufficiently mentally-ill
so as to be unable to properly express their desire to enter a public institution
for the mentally ill voluntarily.
Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed Jan. 3, 1972, in the Probate Court, Wayne County, Michigan,
File No. 183-736, at 8-9.
55 In response to the decision in Slayton the statute was amended to read as follows:
The superintendent of any institution named in this act under the department
of mental health may receive and detain for treatment any adult who submits
himself to treatment as a voluntary patient, and who makes written appli-
cation therefore, and whose mental condition is such as to render him
competent to make application. The superintendent of any institution named
in this act or under the control and jurisdiction of the department of mental
health may receive and detain for treatment any person under 18 years of age
and not an emancipated child whose parent or guardian made a written
application therefore.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.18a (now superseded).
56 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
57 No. 135894 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Err. 1973).
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obtaining his release. Although the relevant statute58 could rea-
sonably have been found to have made no provision for voluntary
commitment of a minor by his or her parents, the court declined
to rest its decision on that ground. Instead, it read the statute in
the context of the Connecticut "Patient's Bill of Rights," 59 which
authorizes a minor of the age of sixteen or older to apply for and
be admitted to a mental hospital as a voluntary patient, and
concluded,
It therefore logically follows that if one between the ages of
sixteen and eighteen can admit himself into an institution as a
voluntary patient, he has the same right to sign himself out
under § 17-187, whether or not his parents originally initiated
the admission.
60
There is, then, at least one instance in which a minor child
has been recognized to have the right to remove himself, in the
face of parental opposition, from an institution to which he has
been "voluntarily" admitted. It is but a short step from this
position to its logical consequence: if a minor child's desire to
leave an institution to which he or she has been "voluntarily"
admitted has been given legal recognition, his desire not to be
"voluntarily" admitted to an institution at all should also be given
legal recognition. Indeed, there is good reason to anticipate that
this recognition will be forthcoming in the very near future. In
Bartley v. Haverford State Hospital,6 ' a class action suit on
behalf of all minors in Pennsylvania who have been "volunteered"
for admission to mental hospitals by their parents or guardians, a
three-judge court has recently denied a defense motion to dismiss.
Instead, it has appointed plaintiff's attorneys guardians ad litem
for all such institutionalized minors and has ordered the appoint-
ment of counsel on behalf of the parents. A three-judge court in
Saville v. Treadway,6 2 in a case dealing with the voluntary admis-
sion of retarded children, has found unconstitutional a Tennessee
statute authorizing the superintendent of a mental hospital to
5 8 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-187. As the court observed, it does not by its express terms
authorize "the voluntary admission of a minor child to a mental hospital by his parents."
59 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-206 A-K (1971).
60 Melville v. Sabbatino, No. 135894 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Err. 1973).
61 No. 72-2272 (E.D. Pa., April 29, 1974, 3 judges), reported in 8 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 117 (June 1974). See also Waller v. Catholic Social Services (E.D. Pa., filed July 12,
1974). Plaintiff, a thirteen year old female in a state hospital charges defendant with
violating her constitutional right to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the
purposes of her commitment by detaining her in the hospital after the hospital itself had
indicated it was no longer necessary to do so.
62 No. 6969 (N.D. Tenn. April, 1974), reported at 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 119 (June
1974).
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admit minors on the application of their parents or guardians. The
court has ordered review of the cases of minors so in-
stitutionalized and has established the presumption that those
minors under sixteen years of age would refuse institutionalization
if given the opportunity and must therefore be treated as in-
voluntary admissions. A similar case is pending in Maryland,6 3
where plaintiff seeks the right to pre-admission hearings.
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER STANDARDS
There is a large body of opinion to the effect that the question
of whether parents should have the right to place their children in
therapeutic institutions should never be seriously raised.64 Ac-
cording to this position, the parental role in providing for the
child's mental health is analogous to the parental role in providing
for his physical health. When a child needs treatment for a physic-
al ailment, it is the parent's unquestioned duty to see to it that
such treatment is obtained. 65 If the ailment is so serious as to
require the hospitalization of the child, nobody questions the
parent's right to make the necessary arrangements for his admis-
sion, and no one suggests that the child should have the right to
refuse to go. The question of personal liberty is simply not re-
garded as relevant in this context. The parent is viewed as having
the responsibility to provide adequate medical care for his child
and the placement of a child in a therapeutic institute is nothing
more that an occasion in which the parent is called upon to fulfill
that responsibility. Mr. Samuel Davis, Executive Director of the
Association for Emotionally Disturbed Children, described this
position:
Obviously, if a child had a severe stomach ailment and re-
quired hospitalization, his parents would have to admit him.
We see no reason to change this procedure when psychiatric
hospitalization is required. Given our social system, it seems
quite sensible that families act on behalf of their dependents.
It is a perfectly logical and responsible way to proceed.
66
63 Maryland Association for Retarded Citizens v, Soloman (no. 11-74-228 D. Md., filed
Feb. 1974.) Reported at 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 56 (May, 1974).
64 Interview with Mr. Samuel Davis, note 66 infra. See also note 13 supra.
c Indeed, in some states the failure to obtain necessary treatment for a child suffering
from mental disability may be grounds for a neglect petition, See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 7185-02 (h) (1971).
6 Interview with Mr. Samuel Davis, Executive Director of the Association for Emo-
tionally Disturbed Children, November 16, 1973.
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It follows, it is argued, that any reform permitting a child to
challenge his admission to a hospital, whether general or psy-
chiatric, would be detrimental to the child's interest, since it
would delay his treatment and create unnecessary controversy
and tension.
Although other rationales are often cited in support of the
present system of "voluntary" admission (its informality, its flex-
ibility, the avoidance of unnecessary stigma, the avoidance of an
adversarial relationship between the psychiatrist and the child,
and the preservation of psychiatric resources), the essence of the
matter is that the supporters of the system perceive no adequate
reason to change it. It is argued that the system works well, it is
inexpensive, and it cannot be modified without harmful results.6 7
The suggestion that children who do not need hospitalization may
be admitted has two common responses. The first is that there are
strong informal factors that effectively preclude the possibility of
such an error. The most important of these is the fact that hospi-
tals and child treatment centers are overcrowded. As one hospital
director put it, "we are not exactly looking for business."68 For
most parents, the placement of a child in a psychiatric treatment
facility entails considerable expense and some humiliation.69
Thus, both parents and the hospital have a strong incentive to
avoid hospitalizing the child. A second argument is that, unless
one is willing to assume bad faith-that is, collusion between the
hospital and the parents, it is hard to deny that the psychiatrist
who examines the child is in a better position than anyone else to
determine whether that child is in need of psychiatric assistance.70
67 Id.
68 Every institution visited by the author had a waiting list, some of which were several
months long. Interview with Dr. William Kirk, Director, York Woods Center, Ypsilanti,
Michigan, November 21, 1973.
69 Hartmann says:
For most parents, hospitalization was a traumatic experience, although al-
most all of them .. .expressed a feeling of relief at having the burden of the
care and responsibility of the sick adolescent lifted from the shoulders of the
family.
E. HARTMANN, ADOLESCENTS IN A MENTAL HOSPITAL 84, (1968).
70 There is. however, a significant body of opinion to the effect that the ability of the
psychiatric profession to diagnose mental illness and to differentiate among its various
manifestations is not all that it might be and. in fact. is so limited that little deference
should be given to it. The proponents of this view, observing correctly that psychiatry is
not a precise science, buttress their position with various "empirical" studies. One such
investigation is reported in Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250
(1973). There a number of professionals applied for admission to mental hospitals, repre-
senting that they were hearing voices. Once admitted, they purported to act in a normal
fashion. The object of the investigation was to discover how long it would take for the
hospital staff to determine that they were not in fact in need of in-patient care. i.e., that
they were normal. The time required for such a determination ranged from seven days to
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Again, the analogy to a physical ailment is striking. If a person
suspected that he had a broken leg, he would probably prefer to
have the decision as to whether or not it was broken made by an
orthopedic surgeon rather than by a court.
71
Viewed in this perspective, the proper function of the legal
system is not to put barriers between the needy child and neces-
sary hospitalization, but to provide mechanisms through Which a
child in need of treatment can receive it when the "voluntary"
system breaks down. An interesting discussion of how the legal
system might fulfill this role has been proposed by Nir and Cut-
ler. 72 Observing that most court-ordered referrals of juvenile
delinquents to psychiatric clinics fail therapeutically because of
family reluctance to accept therapeutic intervention, 73 the authors
propose several ways in which the coercive power of the court
may aid the therapeutic rehabilitation of youths. With respect to
those juveniles who are likely to be unable to control their tenden-
cy to "act out"7 4 but who are not in need of hospitalization, they
fifty-two days. The author's conclusion was that psychiatrists cannot distinguish "sane"
from "insane" persons in a hospital setting.
The survey, and others like it, are subject to attack on several grounds. It is initially to
be observed that, as indicated by the introduction to the article, the investigators were not
objective; rather, they were attempting to garner support for a pre-determined conclusion.
The methodology is also highly suspect. A psychiatrist conducting intake interviews at a
mental hospital has a right to expect that a person seeking admission to the hospital is
doing so because he feels in need of the treatment provided there. When presented with a
person who claims to be hearing voices, it is not unreasonable for him to assume that the
person actually perceives himself to be hearing voices. Even if the assumption were not
made, the psychiatrist would be justified in concluding that a person who lied about
hallucinations in order to obtain admittance to a mental hospital might be a worthy person
to admit, if only to permit a diagnosis of the pathology leading to the lie. Certainly it is
grossly unfair to expect either the psychiatrist or the intake staff to be on guard against the
possibility that the person seeking admission was a reasonable healthy individual who was
attempting deceit in order to thereby demonstrate professional fallibility.
Finally, psychiatrists have never held themselves out as being capable of making rapid
diagnoses. The process of diagnosis, even where deliberate deception is not an element, is
a time consuming one. Thus, accepting the study's data at face value, it remains question-
able what conclusions might legitimately be drawn from it.
71 This analogy has its weaknesses, chiefly the imprecise nature of psychiatry in contrast
to orthopedic medicine.
72 Nir & Cutler, The Therapeutic Utilization of the Juvenile Court, 130 AM. J. Psy-
CHIATRY 1112 (October 1973).
73 It became clear to the authors that:
our young patients were being used by their families to "act out the
parent's poorly integrated and forbidden impulses". The parent's resistance
to treatment was an attempt to maintain the psychodynamic equilibrium of
which the delinquent behavior of the youngster was an integral part, and a
recommendation for psychotherapy or institutional placement had little
chance of being accepted unless one could find leverages powerful enough to
interrupt the tendency toward acting out.
Id. at 1113.
74 The term "act out" is used to describe behavior, frequently of an anti-social nature, in
which is manifested an individual's pathology.
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suggest the use of extended and closely supervised probationary
periods. For those who refuse to take part in court ordered
outpatient therapy, they further suggest a strict probation with
attendance at psychotherapy as one of its conditions.
75
The difficulty with approaching the issue of the "voluntary"
admission solely from the perspective of a treatment problem,
however, is that the child's rights are not considered at all. The
assumption that the issue of the child's rights is not relevant to the
issue of "voluntary" admissions is equivalent to the position that
the child simply has no rights in this area. 76 If that assumption is
made, the position is unassailable. But it is the reluctance to make
that assumption, the contention that the minor does in fact have
certain rights independent of those exercised on his behalf by his
parents or by the state, that is at the foundation of any consid-
eration of the issue.
The polar opposite of this view is the position that the rights of
an individual should not be a function of his age. With respect to
"voluntary" admission, this view would require that there be no
distinction between the manner in which an adult is placed in a
therapeutic institution and the manner in which a minor is placed
in a therapeutic institution. Under this system, voluntary admis-
sion would require a true manifestation of informed consent on
the part of the child. In the absence of such consent, the child
could be placed in an institution only through formal commitment
proceedings. These proceedings would, as with adults, entail the
convening of a full hearing at which the minor would be represent-
ed by counsel and afforded full due process safeguards. The court
would have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
minor was dangerous to himself or others if left unhospitalized,
75 The authors illustrate with the following case history:
John, a 16 year old, was brought to the court on a PINS (person in need of
supervision) petition by his mother because of his uncontrollable behavior
and excessive truancy, stealing, and procuring .... Our assessment revealed
that although the plan of choice for John would be placement in a residential
center, his mother would not accept this because of her close attachment to
all her children, especially John. She condoned his behavior as she identified
with his acting out and his frequent sexually perverse behavior .... We used
two leverages to implement our recommendation: I) We requested the court
to keep the case open in order to maintain the crisis momentum; 2) we
worked with the attendance officer of the school in order to effect a truancy
charge against John, which would make it almost mandatory for the judge to
remand the child to a residential treatment center.
Id. at 1114-15.
76 Mr. Davis said:
We are brought to deal with this very concrete problem on a very high level
of abstraction. . . . I do believe in personal liberty. What has that got to do
with the hospitalization of children? I don't see that the personal liberty of
the child includes the right of self-destruction.
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and that no less drastic measure would suffice. 77 In brief, control
over the minor's placement in a therapeutic institution would be
taken away from his parents and placed in the hands of the minor
and the state. As envisioned, the system would require the pres-
ence of hospital psychiatrists at court hearings whenever a child
was to be admitted. One of two results would be probable: either
an enormous strain would be placed on community psychiatric
resources, with a concomitant reduction in the quality of ser-
vice, or the hearings would revert to essentially pro forma rituals.
Every psychiatrist interviewed strongly opposed this system, and
several went so far as to flatly state that rather than spend so
much time in court, they would simply refuse to take nonvolunta-
ry patients. With the demand for psychiatric services as great as it
is, the effect would probably be to defeat the purpose of the
proposal altogether.
Another danger in such a system becomes evident if one con-
siders the consequence of a successful defense on the part of the
child. His parents have attempted to place him in an institution
because they believe that they cannot deal with him. If he returns
to the family as before, then nothing has changed. Whatever
situation brought about the attempt at placement has been ex-
acerbated by the attempt itself. Where, then, is the minor to go?
In any event, the legal system has thus far shown little in-
clination to do away with the legal distinctions between minors
and adults. 78 Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in
Ginsberg v. New York, 79 expressed the prevailing judicial philoso-
phy:
I think that a State may permissibly determine that, at least in
some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amend-
ment guarantees. It is only upon such a premise, I should
suppose, that a State may deprive children of other
rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to
vote- deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable
for adults. 80
77 A more extreme version of this system would delay action until the individual had
actually committed an act punishable as a crime. At that point a trial as to guilt or
innocence would be held. If the individual were found guilty, a second hearing as to his
disposition would be held. It would be at this hearing that the decision whether to
hospitalize would be made.
78 There is currently a class-action lawsuit in the Probate Court for Wayne County,
Michigan challenging this very distinction.
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
80 Id., at 649-50.
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I11. THE MICHIGAN PROPOSAL
Michigan has recently undertaken a thorough revision of its
mental health laws."' In the process, it is proposed to give statu-
tory recognition to the proposition that a minor faced with the
prospect of "voluntary admission" ought to be permitted to do
something about it. While the proposal does not give the minor
any right before the fact, he is permitted an appeal after hospitali-
zation.
As presently drafted, the law provides that "an individual less
than 18 years of age may be hospitalized as a formal voluntary
patient"8 2 if an application to that effect is made by his parent or
guardian, and if the application is accepted by the hospital direc-
tor.83 Upon hospitalization, the individual, if he is at least thirteen
years old, is informed of his right to appeal his placement, and he
receives a copy of an application to institute such an appeal.84 In
addition, he may direct that a copy of the application be given to
one other person. 5 Objection to the hospitalization of a minor of
any age may be made by a person "found suitable by the court ' 6
or by the individual himself if he is at least thirteen years old.
8 7
The application must be made within thirty days of hospitalization
and, once made, may not be repeated more than once every three
months.88 If the hospital has formally agreed to admit the minor
but has not yet done so, objection may be made prior to hospitali-
zation. 9 If a hospitalized minor desires to object, the hospital is
required to assist him in submitting his objection to the courtY0
Upon receipt of an objection the court is to schedule a hearing
within seven days, and must so notify the objecting person, the
patient, the person who made the application, and the director of
the hospital. 91
At the hearing, the patient is given only such due process
safeguards as the court, in its discretion, "deems necessary to
ensure that all pertinent information is brought to its attention." 92
Such fundamental matters as the appointment of counsel, the right
81 Mich. 1974 Public Act no. 258 (Aug. 6, 1974).
82 id., § 415(2).
- Id., § 415(2).
84 Id., §416.
8 id.
I' id., § 417(i).87 id., § 417(l).
88 Id.
89 1d., § 418.
9()d., §417 (2).
9 1 Id., §417 (3).
92 Id., § 417 (4).
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to an independent psychiatric evaluation, the right to be present at
the- hearing, and the right to have the issue of his need for
treatment submitted to a jury -matters which are guaranteed in all
other hearings9 3 -are specifically excluded from this one.9 4
Unless the court sustains the objection, the hospital may con-
tinue to hold the minor. In order to sustain the objection, the
court must find that the minor is not in need of treatment which is
available at the hospital or that a treatment program not involving
hospitalization is available and appropriate for the individual9 5
Although it is not expressly stated, it is implicit that the burden of
proof is upon the one making the objection.9 6 The unwillingness
or inability of the parent or guardian of the minor to provide for
him is not to be considered grounds for denial of the objection. In
that event, the court is to convene a proceeding in the juvenile
court for the purpose of ensuring that the minor will receive
proper care. 9
7
The proposal has serious deficiencies from several points of
view. Except in those situations in which there is a postponement
of his admission, the minor who wishes to object will find that he
may do so only after having been hospitalized, and this is so
whether or not he was hospitalized under emergency circum-
stances. Having been hospitalized, he is placed in the difficult
position of being compelled to show why he should not be. If the
minor is under thirteen, he is deprived both of the power to
proceed on his own behalf and of effectively seeking the assis-
tance of anyone else.9 8 He is not given a lawyer as of right, and
even if a lawyer is provided, this is not done until the hearing.9 9 If
he is to be released, he must be able to demonstrate, without the
benefit of independent psychiatric evaluation, that he is not in
need of treatment which is available at the institution. The alter-
nate ground for release, that there is another approach to treat-
ment which would be adequate and which does not involve his
hospitalization, would be difficult for a skilled attorney working
with a social worker to demonstrate; but to expect an incarcerated




95 1 d., § 417 (6).
96 Id., § 417(5), (6).
97 Id., §417 (7).
98 Id., § 417 (1).
99 Id., § 417 (4).
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burden is obviously futile. This standard is in striking contrast to
that provided for the involuntary commitment of adults.100
The proposal is also unsatisfactory to hospital administrators.
Those who were interviewed uniformly expressed a fear that a
minor who availed himself of the appeal process after being hos-
pitalized would be unresponsive to treatment until after the pro-
ceeding was concluded and would have a strong disruptive effect
on his ward. 011 In fact, it was at the request of the hospital
administrators that the provision for appeal in advance of hospi-
talization was added to the law.102
Finally, it is not unlikely that, should the law be challenged, it
would be found unconstitutional. While the United States Su-
preme Court has yet to rule on the issue of whether or not a
person faced with civil commitment must be provided with coun-
sel, both federal and state courts have ruled in the affirmative.'
03
This trend, considered in light of the holding in In re Gault10 4 that
juveniles have a right to counsel in juvenile court proceedings
despite their "rehabilitative" nature, indicates that there is little
reason to distinguish between minors and adults in this matter.
Briefly, then, the Michigan proposal, while laudable in that it
does recognize a theoretical right vested in the minor, is in prac-
tice unlikely to provide the minor with any significant degree of
protection, is likely to bring some measure of disruption in the
hospitals and might well be constitutionally infirm. Given all of
this, the question may be asked: To what end? Why make such an
1001d., § 401.
A person who is mentally ill, and who as a result of that mental illness can
reasonably be expected within the near future to intentionally or uninten-
tionally seriously physically injure himself or another person, and who has
engaged in an act or acts or made significant threats that are substantially
supportive of the expectation; b) A person who is mentally ill, and who as a
result of that mental illness is unable to attend to those of his basic physical
needs, such as food, clothing, or shelter that must be attended to in order for
him to avoid serious harm in the near future, and who has demonstrated that
inability by failing to attend to those basic physical needs.
101 Interview with Dr. William Kirk, Director York Woods Center, Ypsilanti, Mich.,
November 21, 1973; interview with Dr. Peter Blos, Director, Children's Psychiatric
Hospital, Ann Arbor, Mich.
102 Id.
103 Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964); People ex rel. Woodall v.
Bigelos, 20 N.Y.2d 852, 231 N.E.2d 777,285 N.Y.S.2d 85, (1967); People ex rel. Rodgers
v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573.(1966). See also note 5
supra.
104 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also In re Fisher, 43 L.W. 2050 (Ohio, Aug. 6, 1974). After
citing Gault, the court observes:
This Court does not believe the fact that civil commitment for the mentally
deficient is for treatment and rehabilitation distinguishes this situation from
juvenile delinquency proceedings. In both situations the liberty of the in-
dividual is at stake.
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investment in time and energy to draft and bring about the pas-
sage of an essentially nonfunctional piece of legislation?
This question was posed to Larry Owens, General Counsel for
the Committee to Redraft the Michigan Mental Health Code. He
said first that the statute is far better than nothing. Whatever its
failings, it remains true that it is the most far-reaching proposal of
its kind ever adopted by a state legislature. 10 5 It does provide a
mechanism for the protection of the minor's rights in an area
where there was previously no protection at all. It is a basis upon
which further progress might be structured. A concerned in-
dividual, aware of the plight of a particular child, might be moved
to take action on his behalf, which would have been impossible
before. A conscientious court, faced with an apparently clear case
of "dumping, ' 10 6 might be moved to appoint a counsel or to
convene a hearing for the purpose of finding alternate placement
for the minor. Moreover, there is no reason that the law might not
be liberalized in the future.
Second, the statute is the most that might be expected to win
general acceptance. While the hospital administrators do not care
for much of it, they are willing to accept it.10 7 While various other
groups within the community do not necessarily favor it, there is
the possibility that it may survive, if it is not perceived as too
"radical." Ultimately, this very real political question is the final
determinant.
While these may be valid considerations from the point of view
of one engaged in the effort of passing specific legislation, the fact
remains that the statute as a whole is inadequate. At a min-
imum, any statute which purports to offer real protection to the
minor faced with involuntary hospitalization should incorporate
three basic attributes. First, it should provide for the completion
of the adjucative process prior to the hospitalization of the minor,
except in emergency situations. Second, instead of requiring the
minor to demonstrate his stability, those desiring the admission of
the minor should have the burden of proving both his need for
hospitalization and that of showing that no alternative'0 8 other
than hospitalization would suffice. Finally, the minor must be
'0 This is, of course, a matter of personal judgment.
106 A minor who is placed in an institution, not because of therapeutic consideration, but
because his or her presence in the family is a source of annoyance or inconveriience, is
said to have been "dumped". The term is quite commonly used, and with full connotative
import.
107 See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
108 See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and their Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972).
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provided both with counsel and the right to an independent psy-
chiatric evaluation from the beginning of the adjudicative process.
That the adjudicative process should, whenever possible, be
completed before the minor is hospitalized is both an elemental
aspect of due process and a practical advantage to the goal of
proper and effective treatment. Unless there is some pressing
need for immediate hospitalization, it is hard to see that anyone is
harmed by delaying hospitalization of a minor long enough for
effective adjudication. In practice, there is often a considerable
period of time between the decision to hospitalize and the actual
admittance. 10 9 Thus, in many cases, there would be no additional
delay at all. In addition, by having the question of admissibility
resolved prior to hospitalization, a number of the disadvantages of
having the "objection" process take place after hospitalization are
avoided. There is no element of uncertainty in the status of the
hospitalized minor, and the prospect of psychiatric "untreatabil-
ity" because of a belief that he will be released is accordingly
diminished. Similarly, the "contamination" of the ward is not a
danger.11 0 Indeed, in this respect, the minor hospitalized after an
adjudicative process would be in very nearly the same position as
one hospitalized through the traditional voluntary admission, be-
cause in both instances the difficulties inherent in treating an
individual who is not compelled to respond in an "appropriate"
manner are minimized." The objection to openly involving the
hospital in the adjudicatory process because this would destroy
the therapeutic relationship between patient and doctor' 1 2 is rele-
vant whether the adjudicatory process occurs before hospitaliza-
tion or after. Perhaps this effect would even be lessened in the
former instance.
113
It might be possible to further diminish the hospital's in-
volvement in the adversarial process by altering the procedure by
109 See note 55 supra.
110 See note 82 and accompanying text supra. The notion of "contamination" is a
therapeutic one. The suggestion is that one individual expressing a certain behavioral trait
may "contaminate" the ward in which he or she is placed, bringing about a situation in
which a number of other individuals who might not otherwise manifest that trait to any
extent are affected by it. The notion is by no means confined to this situation. Here,
however, the thinking appears to be that an individual who does not wish to be treated will
be able to successfully resist treatment as long as he or she believes the situation to be
temporary, and that the incarceration is about to end. The danger is that he will con-
taminate the entire ward, bringing about a situation in which a number of other patients
begin to manifest this same resistance; the patient thereby undermines the therapeutic
relationship for others.
I1 See text accompanying notes 10 1-102 supra.
112 See note 101 supra. This is a frequently voiced fear.
11 See notes 10 1-102 and accompanying text supra.
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which the minor is admitted. Instead of having the hospital agree
to admit the minor, as is presently the case, the hospital could
agree to do so, provided that upon an independent evaluation in a
judicial setting the minor was found to be a statutorily suitable
person for such admission. The matter would then be referred to
the court, and the hospital would have no further involvement in
the decision-making process. Upon receipt of such a referral, the
court would appoint an independent psychiatrist to prepare an
evaluation of the minor. If this psychiatrist felt that the minor met
the statutory standards for hospitalization and that there was no
less restrictive alternative available,11 4 a hearing would be con-
vened. Prior to the hearing, the minor would receive appointed
counsel 1 5 and the right to his own psychiatric evaluation. At the
hearing, the court-appointed psychiatrist, rather than hospital per-
sonnel, would testify and be called upon to justify his or her
conclusion.
There are several difficulties with this suggestion. If it were
implemented, the admissions process would become lengthier and
possibly more cumbersome than it is today. A greater burden and
greater costs would fall upon the judicial system. In order to
protect the minor's right to confrontation it would be necessary to
devise safeguards against the possibility of the court psychiatrist
forming his opinion on the basis of information obtained from the
hospital. Finally, this procedure would be inadequate in any situ-
ation where the minor, having been previously admitted, wished
to be released.11 6 Whether the advantages are of sufficient weight
to outweigh these considerations is certainly debatable."17 Insofar
as the burden of proof at the hearing would be assignable, it
should rest with those seeking to hospitalize the minor. The
alternative, requiring the minor to prove that he need not be
hospitalized, is not accepted in the civil commitment of adults.
There is no logical reason to distinguish between adults and
minors in this respect. Similarly, those seeking hospitalization of
the minor should be required to show by convincing evidence that
there is no less drastic alternative to hospitalization that would
achieve the purposes of hospitalization. 1 8
114 See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
115 See notes 119-126 and accompanying text infra.
116 See Appendix infra.
117 There are two possible advantages: the preservation of psychiatric resources and the
elimination of the "adversariness" from the doctor-patient relationship. As to the former, it
is not immediately clear that having one psychiatrist testify in the place of another results
in a very great savings.
118 See note 108 and accompanying text supra. This is particularly so where the
admissions standard does not require a showing of dangerousness.
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Courts have uniformly held that if a hearing in which in-
carceration is likely is to meet the requirements of fundamental
due process, the person so threatened must be given access to
counsel.' 19 As the Supreme Court said in Powell v. Alabama,120
which first established the right to counsel for indigents charged
with felonies:
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel ... such refus-
al would be a denial of a hearing, and therefore, of due
process .... 121
The logic of the case is clear: the ordinary citizen, confronted by
the power of the state, is simply not competent to defend himself
without expert assistance. If he is poor, it must be made available
to him, for otherwise the hearing is impartial in form only. This
same logic applies a fortiori to the position of a minor confronted
with civil incarceration. If anything, a minor is less able to fend
for himself in a judicial setting than is an indigent adult.
Traditionally, of course, minors have not been represented by
counsel. The results of this policy, which is founded upon the
assumption that someone other than the minor is in a better
position to speak for his or her interests, have been unfortunate:
... [I]t appears that a very high proportion of statutes
affecting infants have never or rarely been construed by state
courts of last resort .... Many cases which raise substantial
questions of the rights of infants have been decided on other
bases without adversion to those rights. . . apparently be-
cause a parent or some other party did battle with
briefs ... solely on the basis of their own interest. In the
areas of law where infants traditionally have been unrepre-
sented, many of the rules seem crude and careless with regard
to their interests. Yet none of these observations have any
validity for areas where infants generally have been repre-
sented, such as probate law .... These impressions, if they
are correct, suggest that without counsel, rights not only fail
to be vindicated; they fail also to be created.' 2
2
In almost any context in which the status, position, or future
placement of a minor is involved, the minor should be provided
with counsel. It is simply unrealistic for another party to an
119 See note 103 supra.
120 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
121 Id. at 69.
122 Klienfield. The Balance of Power among Infants, Their Parents, and the State, 4
Family L.Q. 320 323-24 (1970).
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action, who has his own interests with which to be concerned, to
be expected to adequately safeguard those of a minor involved in
the matter.
Crucial, then, to the informed implementation of the guide-
lines to child placement is not only party status for the child
as a person in his own right but also adequate provision for
his personal representation by counsel who has no other goal
than to determine what is the least detrimental alternative for
his client. In proceedings before the court or administrative
agency, counsel for the child must independently interpret
and formulate his client's interests, including the need for a
speedy and final determination. 123
It is necessary that counsel be well versed in the legal and
medical parameters of a situation in which a parent wished to
place a child in a mental hospital against the child's wishes. 124 The
difficulties facing an attorney in such a position are, to be sure,
legion. 125
These special difficulties do not, however, suggest that courts
should develop a different conception of the lawyer's role in
civil commitment .... What the difficulties do suggest is that
the attorneys working in the area need to develop not only
special knowledge about psychiatric issues but also a high
degree of self-awareness and sophisticated skills in in-
terviewing and counseling. These special demands, in turn,
indicate that wherever possible states should create systems
of counsel that rely on persons who specialize in civil com-
mitment matters on a full time basis. 126
APPENDIX:
DRAFT OF A PROPOSED STATUTE
1. A person less than 18 years of age may be hospitalized 127 either by
voluntary admission, as defined herein, or by involuntary admission.
2. A person less than 18 years of age may be hospitalized as a
voluntary admission if he or she consents to such hospitalization, and if
the director of the hospital deems him or her clinically suitable for that
123 A. FREUD, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 66 (1973).
124 Anadlaman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment:
A Survey, Polemic, anda Proposal, 45 MIss. L.J. 43, 53 (1974).
125 See Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and their Parents: The Impact of Wyman
v. James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259 (1971).
126 Andalman & Chambers, supra note 100, at 54.
127 Hospital is to be understood to refer not only to psychiatric hospitals themselves, but
to residential treatment facilities as well.
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form of hospitalization. If the person is less than 13 years of age, the
consent of the person or persons who are his or her parents or guardians
shall also be required. 12 Prior to admission, a written application for
admission as a voluntary patient shall be executed by the minor, and, if
he or she is less than 13 years of age, by his or her parent or guardian.
Such application must be signed by the minor.
3. Before accepting a minor for admission as a voluntary patient, the
hospital director shall explain to the minor in clear and simple language,
that the application is voluntary, and that the minor need not execute it
if he or she does not wish to do so. The hospital director shall ascertain
that the minor understands the nature of the application and is making
an informed consent, before accepting the application.
4. If at any time subsequent to admission, the minor desires to leave
the hospital, he or she may so inform the hospital director. If the minor
is at this time less than 16 years of age, the consent of his or her parents
or guardian shall also be required. If the minor desires to leave the
hospital, and the consent of his or her parents or guardian is not forth-
coming, the hospital director shall notify the court. The hospital director
may, at his or her discretion, notify the court that he or she does not
deem it appropriate to release the minor from the hospital. Unless such
notification is given to the court within five days of the request, the
hospital shall discharge the minor.
5. Upon receiving such notification from the hospital director, the
court shall immediately schedule a hearing, which shall be conducted in
the manner set forth for an involuntary admission. At the same time, the
court shall appoint counsel for the minor. Due provision shall be made
for consultation between the minor and his or her attorney prior to the
hearing. The hearing shall be held within five days of the hospital's
notification to the court of its objection to the release of the minor.
6. A person less than 18 years of age may be hospitalized as an
involuntary admission if, after an appropriately conducted hearing, the
court concludes that such placement would be the least detrimental
alternative for the minor. 129
128 A compromise must be made here. It is recognized that there are minors who seek
hospitalization without the consent of their parents. Hence the age at which one is entitled
to be voluntarily admitted to a mental hospital for treatment without parental consent is
reduced from 18 to 13 years of age. However, this does not address itself to the minor
under the age of 13 who seeks such admission. Arguably, it would be possible to devise a
system whereby a minor under the age of 13 would have access to a process through
which he or she could obtain admission to a mental hospital despite parental opposition,
perhaps through the intervention of school counselors or other informed and concerned
persons. Several factors counsel against such a process. First it must be acknowledged
very few minors would avail themselves of such a system. Second, any such system would
of necessity be procedurally unwieldly, and would create the danger of unwarranted or
overzealous intervention. Third, difficult obstacles with respect to parental rights over their
young children would first have to be surmounted. Finally, a satisfactory method of
identifying informed consent as expressed by a young child would have to be devised.
129 See A. FREUD et al. supra note 123, 53-64.
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7. Application for admission to a hospital as an involuntary admission
shall first be made to the hospital by the parents or guardians of the
child. If the hospital director deems the minor suitable for admission, he
or she may tentatively agree to admit the minor, subject to the decision
of the court. The hospital director shall immediately notify the court of
the application for admission.
8. The court shall schedule a hearing to be held not less than five
days nor more than thirty days from receipt of such notification. At the
same time the court shall appoint counsel for the minor. Due provision
shall be made for consultation between the minor and his or her attorney
prior to the hearing, and for an independent psychiatric examination of
the minor. Compensation in an amount which is reasonable and based
upon time and expenses for the attorney and for the individual or
individuals conducting the independent psychiatric examination shall be
made from court funds. Counsel for the minor shall be allowed adequate
time for investigation of the matters at issue and for preparation, and
shall be permitted to present such evidence as counsel believes necet-
sary, including evidence as to alternatives to hospitalization.
9. The minor shall have the right to be present at the hearing, the
right to be represented by counsel, the right to an independent psy-
chiatric evaluation, the right to present documents and witnesses and to
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to have the question of whether
he requires treatment be heard by a jury.
10. Unwillingness or inability of the parent, guardian, or person in
loco parentis to provide for the management, care or residence of the
minor shall not be grounds for ordering the involuntary admission of the
minor. In that event the court may cause a proceeding to be convened to
ensure that appropriate management, care, or residence is provided.
11. The minor may not be found to require treatment unless at least
one qualified person who has personally examined him testifies in person
at the hearing.
12. If the court finds, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence,
that the minor is in need of such treatment as is available at the hospital,
and that there is no other treatment program that does not involve
hospitalization which is available and appropriate -for the minor, it shall
approve the application for involuntary admission.
13. A minor involuntarily admitted to a hospital may not request a
new hearing on the matter of his release for a period of three months
following the date of the original hospitalization.
-Louis Lessem
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